For every two videos on civilian life, there was another that focused on the military aspect of IS's operations.
New recruits training with sniper rifles, “martyrs” reading out their wills shortly before blowing themselves up, and enemy positions being attacked in carefully choreographed raids.
Amid this constant juxtaposition of civilian and military life, the propagandists continuously played upon the victimhood narrative.
They routinely paraded dead or maimed children, women and old people before cameras as they sought to maximise the political value of the collateral damage caused by enemy air strikes.
Whether they were depicting the aftermath of Syrian government airstrikes or those carried out by the international anti-IS coalition, the images in these reports were consistently horrific.
They were used to both legitimise the existence of IS's self-proclaimed caliphate and justify the innumerable crimes of its active members.
Contrary to the countless reports that had emerged in July claiming that IS was toning down its brutality, the spectre of ultraviolence was never far off.
Only five days into Shawwal a video was released in which an pro-Assad soldier was shot in the back and cast off a cliff in Syria's Hama province.
Four days later footage emerged depicting the consecutive beheading of three “spies” in Iraq. And, shortly after that, a video showed a group of “enemies” of IS in Afghanistan being tied up and murdered - killed by the buried explosives they had been forced to sit on.
The further the month progressed, the clearer the motivations behind IS's killing became.
A warning was being sent out, but not to the international community. The intended target audience for these videos were the potential dissenters living in IS-held territories.
They were being told that they face a zero-sum game - stay on side, and enjoy the IS utopia, or assist the enemy and die in awful cruelty.
Importantly, though, these warnings came sparingly - IS's propagandists want to scare and brutalise their audiences, but they don't want to desensitise them completely.
They clearly want - and need - to convey a more nuanced message than can be achieved with violence alone.
Once I had assessed the dataset, I realised that this propaganda was not just buoying up the IS abroad - attracting new supporters, sustaining old sympathisers and drawing in donors - it was keeping it afloat at home, too.
Put yourself in the shoes of a normal civilian living in any of the many IS-held towns and villages.
You have no free access to the internet and, for those occasional moments that you do, there is an IS fighter breathing down your neck watching your every move.
There is no freedom of information under IS, no counter-narratives, no challenging information, nothing other than that “news” provided in droves by the IS propagandists and broadcast at the myriad makeshift media points across its territory.
In the pamphlets distributed from these points, the videos playing on their widescreen TVs and projectors, the statements and bulletins ringing from their speakers, there is only the propagandists' idealised image of the “caliphate” ringing out.
The audience is well and truly captive.
In a sense, this is happening online, too. I was doing it for research purposes but, for many IS supporters, propaganda is their only stream of news and information.
Social media is well known for its echo chambers, in which users end up self-selecting their own nuance-free virtual existence. When this dynamic is combined with an intoxicating propaganda output like that of IS, it becomes all the more potent.
Even though it is well within their capabilities to access other ideas, the group's online supporters rarely, if ever, go looking for them.
To all intents and purposes, they become addicts of the IS marketing model.
In July, I embarked on this project with the aim of achieving deeper insight into IS's propaganda strategy. But what emerged was something far more useful.
With a full view of its media output, even just for one month, I was able to dissect and evaluate the means by which the group projects itself, both within and without its borders.
Equipped with a continuation of this project, with the exact knowledge of what IS decision-makers want to project - and when they want to project it - perhaps those involved in the fight against IS could more effectively challenge its information monopoly.