Will Turkish ambitions complicate fight for Mosul?
- Published
With the offensive on Mosul well under way, the simmering tensions between the Shia-dominated Iraqi government and Turkey threaten to open up new fault lines that could greatly complicate the operation. They also raise questions about the future battle for influence in Mosul in particular and, more generally, in northern Iraq.
From the outset of the operation, Turkey has been itching to play a role. This has been resolutely opposed by the government in Baghdad, and the Americans have had to mount some nimble diplomacy to try to ensure the differences between Turkey and Iraq do not overshadow the early stages of the Mosul offensive.
US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter made the point explicitly at the end of last week when, on a visit to Baghdad, he reaffirmed "the vital importance of every country operating with full respect for Iraqi sovereignty". This message was clearly directed at the Turks.
Turkey's interest in Iraq is complex. It is an amalgam of contemporary strategic concerns, domestic politics, and nostalgia for the Ottoman past. The rise of so-called Islamic State has served to weaken the already fragile Iraqi state and it has reduced Syrian territory to a government-controlled rump.
Borders established in the wake of World War One seem far from permanent. A patchwork of ethnic, religious and sectarian groups are seeking to protect their own local interests and many of these groups - most notably the Kurds - straddle the existing borders. No wonder, then, that there continues to be discussion about the cohesion of Iraq, let alone Syria.
But it is not just the internal Syrian and Iraqi factions who are in play. Powerful regional actors like Iran and Turkey are also eager to secure their interests which is why, for example, Turkish troops have moved into northern Syria.
US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter has spoken in support of Iraqi sovereignty
And, as the fighting comes closer to its own border with Iraq, the Ankara government is eager to reinforce its position in that country, too.
Ankara's fundamental strategic concern is to ensure that the Kurdistan Workers' Party - the PKK - which has been mounting an insurgency inside Turkey for decades - does not expand its activities in northern Iraq.
It also wants to limit Iranian influence, Tehran already having significant ties with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. Turkey has cast itself as something of a protector for Sunni Arabs and the Turkmen minority in northern Iraq. That is why it has been so averse to the idea of the involvement of Shia militias in the Mosul campaign.
But there is also a good deal of history here as well, bound up with the increasingly expansive rhetoric of Turkey's increasingly controversial President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Turkey's President Erdogan says that places like Iraq "are... part of our soul"
In a speech in Bursa on 22 October, Mr Erdogan referred back to the immediate post-World War One period, commenting that "we did not voluntarily accept the borders of our country".
He noted that one of modern Turkey's greatest mistakes was "the weakening of our cultural connections".
"With total ignorance," he said, people asked "what business does Turkey have in Iraq, Syria and Bosnia? [But] these geographies are each part of our soul."
In part, this was a powerful attack against the secular regime that had previously ruled modern Turkey. But, equally, it also sent a signal of where Turkey's abiding interests lie.
The Turkish media has been awash with maps showing Turkey's widening horizons. This "irredentist cartography and rhetoric," according to the analyst Nick Danforth, offers a fascinating insight into Turkey's current foreign and domestic policy concerns.
For now, Turkish troops are not going to take part in the Mosul operation. Last week, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi warned of a possible military confrontation if they became involved. "We are ready for them," Mr Abadi said. "This is not a threat or a warning, this is about Iraqi dignity."
Protesters in Baghdad have demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Iraq
But Turkey retains an army base at Bashiqa, a little to the north-east of Mosul, which has been a frequent bone of contention with Baghdad. It keeps up a close military liaison in major population centres of the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government.
Just as in Syria, Turkey has trained a local militia force - the Ninevah Guards - a 3,000-strong force of Sunni Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds. Its potential role in the Mosul operation remains unclear.
But the tensions between Ankara and Baghdad are not going to go away. Turkey, for example, said on Monday that it had employed tank and artillery fire from its base at Bashiqa to assist Peshmerga fighters against IS.
The Iraqi government has moved swiftly to deny the story.
This is a row not so much about the battle for Mosul but about its aftermath. Who will control the region once IS is expelled? Can a highly sectarian Iraqi government really act in the interests of all? How far is Turkey willing to go to back one set of Kurds to exclude another?
And might President Erdogan's neo-Ottoman rhetoric encourage him to play a more active part in Iraq just as he has sought to do in northern Syria ?