Can Europe still count on the US coming to its defence?
Swedish soldiers on Nato exercises in Latvia on Tuesday
- Published
European leaders have been left stunned by the open rapprochement between US President Donald Trump and Russia's Vladimir Putin - and not-so-subtle hints that the US may abandon its obligation to defend European allies.
After World War Two, West European countries joined the US and Canada to set up Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to counter the then-Soviet Union.
The alliance's famous Article 5 holds that Nato members will come to the defence of an ally which comes under attack.
The US has long been the anchoring power, but now questions are being asked openly about Nato's future - most recently by the man set to become Germany's chancellor. Friedrich Merz said his aim would be to achieve independence from the US in terms of security.
"The events of the past week have shown that Trump has undermined Nato, undermined its secretary general and undermined the Article 5 of collective defence," said Armida van Rij, head of the European programme at the UK-based Chatham House think tank.
"The idea behind it was this all for one and one for all belief – and that's been broken."
What is Nato's Article 5 and is it moot?
While the Trump administration says it is not pulling out of Nato and remains committed to the defence partnership with Europe, it has warned that it will "no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency".
Trump has consistently told European allies to considerably raise their financial contributions - at one stage last year he openly encouraged Putin to invade those who failed to pay their bills.
But what is alarming, say experts, is how the message is being delivered as the war in Ukraine - the greatest security crisis for the continent in decades - rages.
Under Trump, the US has started to even promote Russian objectives, said Chatham House defence analyst Minna Alander. "It even looks like Trump outright switched sides into Russia's team."
Some of this pivoting by Trump includes:
Praise for Russia's President Vladimir Putin, who he called earlier this month - the first phone call between the White House and Kremlin since Russia's full-scale invasion three years ago
Talks between the US and Russia last week - which, though aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, cut out Ukrainian officials and European allies
Attacks on Ukraine's President Volodymr Zelensky, who Trump called a "dictator"
Repeating Putin's lies that Ukraine had started the war - not Russia
"This war is far more important to Europe than it is to us - we have a big, beautiful ocean as separation," Trump has said.
The phrasing of Article 5 has long been understood as an automatic obligation by member states - and most significantly, the US military - to come to the other members' defence.
But that does not always mean sending troops.
For example, if Estonia was invaded by Russia, the US could send a single surveillance plane in support and "that would meet the letter if not the spirit of Article 5", explained Edward Arnold, an analyst with the Royal United Services Institute, a defence and security think tank in London.
"There's nothing to suggest that the US has to put its full forces in," he said.
"But the assumption has always been under previous US presidents that that would happen, so now people are starting to worry."
The US is the dominant military power in Nato - committing about 70% of its capabilities and command, Mr Arnold said.
Along with sheer numbers - the US has more than 100,000 troops deployed in Europe - Nato has relied on the US for key capabilities such as planes refuelling mid-air, moving troops or supplies via aircraft, and military mobility.
The US also provides the bulk of nuclear weapons, as well as significant intelligence, logistics, and reconnaissance tools.
And it has always been seen as group leader. The Supreme Allied Commander for Europe - the top military leader in Nato - has always been an American and Americans are in most senior Nato roles.
"Because the US is militarily so overpowering, it has always been a natural leader of Nato," says Ms Rij. No other single European Nato ally can step into that space, she says "because no one has the capabilities or troop levels".
What does Europe do now?
The US warned a decade before Trump, external that Europe would need to step up its defence.
Under Joe Biden, it declared its top security priority would be the Indo-Pacific theatre, amid its competition with China, and thus a shift away from Europe.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine pulled the US's focus back on Europe. But Trump's direction this past fortnight has been the push for a drastic rethink.
Merz said after his German election victory that his "absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA".
He even said he wasn't sure if an alliance leaders meeting in June "would still be talking about Nato in its current form or whether we will have to establish an independent European defence capability much more quickly".
Once in office, Merz will be one of the European Big Three, which includes the UK and France in addition to Germany.
The UK prime minister heads to Washington on Thursday, following the visit there on Monday by French President Emmanuel Macron.
"I don't think there are any good options for Europe at the moment. It's more about avoiding the worst one," said Mr Arnold.
"It is about mitigating risk. It's not about keeping NATO together in its current form."
The Europeans are acting quickly. Greece, Norway and others have voiced concerns while Denmark last week announced a major increase in defence spending.
The UK also announced a hike on Tuesday, cutting foreign aid to fund the extra £13bn a year. Keir Starmer warned it was a "painful" choice, but said defence and security of the country comes first.
Mr Arnold says it's the price Europeans will have to pay, especially as "we've sent so much stuff to Ukraine now, our own stocks are quite dry".
We are seeing now what is a "long term shift" in the global security order, he said.
"The US is not the ally that it once was, and it is very, very unlikely to ever go back to that view," he said.