Image source, Grenfell inquiry

The inquiry's chairman says the second phase of the inquiry has "taken longer than we had hoped", partly due to its broad scope, and partly because they uncovered "many more matters of concern than we had originally expected".

He says it is not possible to properly understand the causes of the fire without understanding the way in which knowledge of the materials and construction developed over time, what the government and others learned about them, and how the regulations developed.

They also looked at how fire safety was managed at Grenfell and the relationship between residents and the tenant management organisation.

Chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick has begun to lay out the findings of the inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire.

1. Manufacturers of cladding products – which were "by far the largest contributor" to the fire – were found to have engaged in "systematic dishonesty", and used "deliberate and sustained strategies" to make their products appear safe
2. Arconic, the company which made the cladding panels on the tower's exterior, is found to have "deliberately concealed" the safety risk; two firms which produced insulation - Celotex and Kingspan - were found to have "misled" the market
3. "Incompetent" companies involved in the 2011 refurbishment of the tower – Studio E and Harley Facades – are found to bear "significant" responsibility for the disaster, while project manager Rydon’s oversight of the work led to a culture of "buck-passing"
4. "Many opportunities" to address the risks posed by flammable cladding were missed by governments from the early 1990s onwards, culminating in "decades of failure"
5. The 2010 Conservative-Liberal Dem government is strongly criticised for its focus on cutting regulation, which led to safety matters being "ignored, delayed or disregarded"
6. Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea council and its social housing arm, the Tenant Management Organisation, had a "persistent indifference to fire safety, particularly the safety of vulnerable people"
7. London Fire Brigade lacked a strategy to evacuate the building once they had lost control, and had an "unfounded assumption" the type of blaze which occurred at Grenfell Tower could not happen

Tom Symonds
Home affairs correspondent

The Grenfell Tower fire that killed 72 people in 2017 was the result of a chain of failures by governments, "dishonest" companies and a lack of strategy by the fire service, the final report of the six-year public inquiry concludes.

The damning report sets out a "path to disaster" at Grenfell stretching back to the early 1990s over how fire safety has been regulated and managed in high rise buildings.

The report says:

• Successive governments "ignored, delayed or disregarded" concerns about the safety of industry practices
• Manufacturers of cladding and insulation products "deliberately concealed" the fire risks they posed
• The way building safety is managed in England and Wales is "seriously defective" and "complex and fragmented"

The publication of the final 1,700-page report comes more than seven years after the fire took hold and spread through cladding on the West London tower block.

We'll bring you more on this breaking story shortly.

Emily Atkinson
Live page editor

The official inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire is set to publish its final report in 10 minutes' time.

More than seven years on from the blaze that killed 72 people and destroyed 151 homes, survivors and loved ones of those who died will hope to finally learn the truth about what happened on 14 June 2017.

We'll bring you the top line and a summary of the findings as the report is published at 11:00.

This will coincide with a statement from inquiry chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick and two panel members, the key lines from which will be posted in this stream.

You can also follow along by hitting watch live above.

There are three members of the panel due to speak at 11:00, to coincide with the publication of their report. They are:

Sir Martin Moore-Bick

The inquiry's chairman is a former judge and barrister, who specialised in commercial disputes.

Moore-Bick was appointed to the Court of Appeal in 2005 and retired from the judicial bench in 2016. He was appointed to the inquiry a year later.

Thouria Istephan

Istephan is an architect and health and safety expert, with more than 25 years experience in the industry.

Among her areas of expertise are "fire safety, buildability, accessibility and inclusive design", according to the inquiry's website.

Ali Akbor

Akbor is the former CEO of a Leeds housing association. He stepped down from his role there to join the panel for the inquiry's second phase in 2019, replacing a panel member who resigned.

He was appointed OBE for services to the community in 2019, and has served on the boards of a number of organisations in the housing sector.

Cachella Smith
Live reporter

I've just arrived at Dorland House in London, where we are expecting to hear from the inquiry's chair soon.

There's a row of cameras lined up at the entrance of the building and reporters waiting outside.

Members of the public have just been allowed into the building in the last few moments, and I've seen some people hug and embrace each other as they greet each other.

We're expecting to hear from victims' groups and family members following the publication of the report.

I'll be here throughout the day to hear their reaction - and perhaps what they'd like to happen next.

Image source, PA Media

Nineteen organisations and 58 individuals are currently under investigation over the fire - but it will be late 2026 before any criminal prosecutions begin.

The Metropolitan Police and Crown Prosecution Service said in May no charges would be announced earlier because of the “scale and complexity” of the inquiry.

Police are examining the role of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea council and its tenant management organisation, companies involved in doing the work, and others which supplied and manufactured building materials.

The delay means it’s likely that, if there are any prosecutions, no defendants will appear in court until 2027.

Grenfell United, the bereaved families and survivor group, have said they need to see justice and that the wait is "unbearable".

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Cundy said previously that "a worst case scenario would be if we rushed the investigation".

Housing activist Kwajo Tweneboa has been speaking to BBC Radio 4's Today programme about the lack of progress seven years on from the Grenfell Tower disaster.

Tweneboa says it's "shameful" there have been several fires since, including a blaze in Dagenham last week, that bear similarities to the Grenfell fire.

"It’s a disgrace that seven years on, 72 people dying in Grenfell wasn’t enough of a catalyst to turbocharge real change nationally," he adds.

Dame Judith Hackitt, who led a review of building regulations and fire safety after the Grenfell fire, also tells our radio colleagues that the progress made since the blaze "has not been fast enough".

She adds: "We have the chance now to accelerate the pace and put lessons we have learnt into action".

Image source, Getty Images

Cladding is a layer of material that is placed onto the outside of a building for purposes including increased insulation, weather protection or to improve appearance.

In the case of Grenfell Tower, panels made from plastic and aluminium (aluminium composite material or ACM) were installed on the sides of the building to make it warmer and drier.

As of the end of July this year, 4,630 residential buildings, external with a height of 11 metres and over had been identified as having unsafe cladding.

At that point, remediation work had been completed on 29% (1,350) of the buildings.

The report into the first phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry revealed how the blaze began, spread and grew into a disaster. These are some of the key findings that influenced the second phase:

• There was swift action taken by the resident of flat 16, where the fire began
• The first firefighters into the flat saw the fire had already spread from the kitchen to the outside - the first evidence that Grenfell's refurbishment was contributing
• Control room supervisors appeared not to have received any specific training to manage the volume of calls
• The significance of calls from some residents was missed, including a 999 call from a resident on floor 22 who was the first to report fire penetrating her flat
• Teams on the ground struggled too, with some firefighters having received no training on how the materials used to refurbish the tower would behave in a fire
• Nobody had an overall full understanding of how to prioritise rescues
• The “stay put” strategy should have been abandoned sooner

The inquiry's chairman, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, has arrived at the Dorland House in Paddington, central London.

The former judge is due to give a statement as part of a panel on the inquiry's findings from 11:00 BST - the same time the final report is published.

We'll be streaming that at the top of this page, as well as providing text updates on all the key lines here.

Ayshea Buksh
BBC London

Last night in North Kensington, Grenfell Tower was lit up in green.

This will be a difficult day for many in the local community.

Bereaved survivors and local residents have been waiting a long time for this final report.

In the lead up, some told me the wait has been agonising and they have lost faith in the process.

Some are sceptical the report will bring about justice for those 72 lives lost.

They wanted to see a police inquiry first before this enormous and expensive public inquiry.

Image source, Reuters

A father trapped with his family on the 21st floor was told "don't give up" by a 999 call operator as they tried to escape the blaze.

Marcio Gomes, his wife Andreia and their two daughters had been sheltering in the living room, having initially been told by the fire service to stay put.

But at 03:25 BST they knew they had no choice but to cover their faces with wet towels and try to get out - down the smoke-choked staircase.

“Every breath you take is making you cough,” Marcio tells the BBC’s Grenfell: Building a Disaster podcast.

In the 999 call, he can be heard pleading with his daughters to keep going:

But as they made their way, the group lost touch. Marcio went back inside the building, searching for one of his daughters, stepping over bodies in the stairwell.

Marcio was eventually taken out of the building by firefighters. He, his wife and daughters survived, but they lost their son, Logan, who was stillborn in hospital after the fire.

This is the third part to a timeline of the spread of the Grenfell Tower fire. The first part can be found here and the second part here.

These posts contain distressing details.

02:25 The fire spreads to the south side of the building.

02:30 The whole of the east of the tower is on fire, Met Police records show.

02:47 The "stay put" advice is withdrawn. The east, north and south sides of the building are up in flames. 107 people remain in the building.

03:21 73 flats are ablaze. By 03:33, the northern side of the building is fully alight.

03:39 LFB stops sending crews above floor four.

03:55 No-one escapes from above the 12th floor after this point. 81 people are left in the building. The fire reaches the south-west corner of the building.

04:03 The fire reaches all sides of the tower. The flames converge on level 23 near the south-west corner, fully enveloping the perimeter.

05:00 The building is fully engulfed. Internal fires continue to rage.

08:07 Some 70 people have not evacuated the building.

19:55 The incident commander concludes that there is "no longer any saveable life in the building".

01:14, 14 July The blaze does not burn itself out until 24 hours later, having destroyed 151 homes, both in the tower and surrounding areas. 72 people have died.

On the night of the fire, Munira Mahmud woke up to see her father-in-law looking through the window of their flat on the fifth floor of Grenfell Tower.

They could hear people "screaming and shouting: 'Fire, fire, get down!'" she tells the BBC’s Grenfell: Building a Disaster podcast.

The family fled and gathered outside near the leisure centre opposite. “That’s when I turned around and it was bad. It was fast… It was summer, there was no wind, but this thing was like someone was blowing on it. It just went up.”

In just 18 minutes, the fire had climbed 19 floors to reach the top of the tower.

She realised her best friend, Rania Ibrahim - who lived on floor 23, the highest level - was still inside. Munira phoned her and begged her to come down, but Rania replied: “It’s not possible.”

Earlier, Rania had been advised by emergency call handlers to stay in her flat. By now the tower's hallways and stairwells were thick with black smoke. She was coughing.

Rania Ibrahim and her two daughters, Hania, aged three, and Fethia, aged four, lost their lives in the fire.

This is the second part to a timeline of the spread of the Grenfell Tower fire. The first part can be found here.

These posts contain distressing details.

01:29 BST The number of 999 calls increases. Some residents head upwards and seek refuge in flats on the upper floors. LFB increases its request for vehicles with pumps to 20, then 25.

01:38 The fire continues to advance along the eastern side of the building and to the north. A total of 144 people have evacuated the building - 149 remain inside. Residents on floors 10, 12, 14, 22 and 23 report fire and smoke to fire crews.

01:52 26 flats are ablaze externally and at least four flats internally. The number of people escaping slows – between around 01:50 and 02:06 no one leaves. The communal lobbies and stairwells in the middle and top appear to have become impassable.

02:06 LFB declares a “major incident” and requests 40 pumps. People start leaving the building at a reduced rate. The fire reaches the centre of the building's east side and spreads across the north side. Fires are raging inside a number of flats.

Image source, PA Media

Firefighter David Badillo was in the first fire engine that attended the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 July 2017, arriving within five minutes of the first 999 call.

At the time, wispy smoke and an orange glow could be seen outside the window to flat 16 - but it was soon clear that all was not as it should be, he tells the BBC’s Grenfell: Building a Disaster podcast.

“I was waiting in the stairwell when some residents came down from a higher floor to say there was fire and smoke. I could see their eyes were watering,” Badillo adds.

If fire regulations had been followed, the fire should have been contained for at least 60 minutes.

At around 01:30 BST, Badillo left the tower to fetch more equipment.

Ten minutes after fire crews arrived on scene, the fire had spread into the cladding and insulation on the outside of the building, with flames moving rapidly upwards.

“To be honest, cladding fire was not even in my vocabulary,” Badillo says.

Over the course of the next six posts, we will take you through expert testimony to the inquiry, external and accounts of the night as told by survivors, detailing minute by minute how the fire spread.

These posts contain distressing details.

00:54 BST The fire begins “in or around” a Hotpoint fridge-freezer in flat 16, floor four. Behailu Kebede, its resident, makes the first 999 call.

01:02 The fire is seen in the flat from outside the building - it has spread from the kitchen window to the exterior. Some residents exit the tower.

01:07 The first fire crew enters flat 16. Kebede leaves the building.

01:15 The fire spreads to floor five. Fire crews use external hoses to try to extinguish the flames.

01:21 The fire reaches floors 11 and 13. A resident on floor 22 calls 999 and is advised to "stay inside”. A floor 14 resident says people can no longer exit via the lobby because it’s filled with smoke.

01:26 Mobile phone videos show the blaze reaching the top floor on the east side. A resident on floor 12 calls 999 to report that that flames are "coming through the floor”.

As we mentioned in our last post, London Fire Brigade (LFB) boss Andy Roe has previously told the BBC that Grenfell residents were told to “stay put for too long” during the fire which destroyed the building.

The fire was reported and 999 call handlers working for the LFB told residents not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke to remain in their flats until help arrived.

The effectiveness of “stay put” - which remains the policy in the event of fire in most high-rise buildings - relies on a building being properly constructed. Regulations should prevent fire spreading from one flat to another for at least 60 minutes.

This was not the case at Grenfell Tower. As part of a refurbishment, combustible cladding and insulation had been fitted on the outside of the building.

In less than 20 minutes, the fire climbed 19 storeys to the top of the tower, fuelled by the flammable materials.

Roe - who was assistant commissioner at the time of the fire - spoke of horror and disbelief on arriving at the scene at 02:30 BST to find three sides of the building alight.

He revoked the "stay put" advice minutes after taking charge at the scene.

• You can listen to more from Andy Roe on the the BBC’s Grenfell: Building a disaster podcast