Duncan Weldon
Economics correspondent

In the past week the Conservatives have dusted off two policies closely associated with the 1980s - Right to Buy and privatisation. Given that the Conservatives dominated 1980s politics, it isn't hard to see why they might be tempted to revive some of the Thatcher era's blockbusters.

And yet - so far at least - these two policies (extending the right to buy your home at a discount to housing association tenants and offering the public a discount in shares of Lloyds bank) have failed to provide much of a boost at the polls. Whilst it is too early for much polling on the Lloyds sale, a YouGov poll this week found the public to be against extending Right to Buy, external.

So, why are policies that proved popular in the 1980s not having the same impact today?

It may partially just be a question of scale.

In 1980, when the original Right to Buy was enacted, around one third of all households lived in a council house. This was a policy that directly impacted a substantial share of voters. By contrast the extension of the scheme to housing associations is far more limited.

Similarly, the sale of Lloyds is comparatively small beer when set against to the sales of British Gas, British Telecom, British Airways and the other big moves of the 1980s. The percentage of UK households holding shares rose from 8% in 1980 to 23% in 1990. Selling Lloyds will have nowhere near as much impact.

Taken together the original Right to Buy and the 1980s privatisations represented a transformation of the UK's political economy. Margaret Thatcher set out to build a "property owning democracy" and she broadly succeeded. Right to Buy 2 and the Lloyds sale will tweak the UK's exiting model rather than transform it.

tweets, external

Duncan Weldon
Economics correspondent

Chris has explained today the Parliamentary procedure on how budgets are actually passed with an eye on Trident renewal. I can't help but think that this situation isn't entirely unprecedented.

In 1910 there were two general elections – both of which proved inclusive. In the second of those elections, external, the results gave the Liberal Party 272 MPs vs the Conservatives on 271. The balance of power was held by the new Labour Party on 42 MPS and the Irish Nationalists on 74. A near tie between the two big parties and a strong showing for a party for a nationalist party that wants to secede from the UK, sounds eerily familiar to modern ears.

The Liberal government was reliant on the Labour Party and the Irish to pass most of its legislation. But when it came to defence, that coalition of votes was less reliable.

There was of course no Trident in 1910, but the nearest equivalent was the Royal Navy. Against a backdrop of a growing German navy, the Conservatives in 1910 had campaigned hard on this issue.

Whilst the Conservatives were almost uniformly in favour of increased naval spending, the Labour Party was broadly pacifist. On the Liberal branches there were those who believed that more defence spending was not a national priority. As one MP put it in a1909 debate: “I do not believe there is a more deadly enemy to social reform in the proceedings of this House than vast expenditure on armaments”, external.

Given they couldn’t rely on either the entirety of their own party, nor their Labour or Irish allies, how did the Liberal government manage to increase naval spending?

By relying on Conservative votes when needed, external. It isn't too hard to imagine a similar scenario in the next Parliament. If the SNP vote against Trident renewal then, as Chris hints, do we really expect the Conservatives to sit on their hands and see it defeated?

tweets, external :

Chris Cook
Newsnight Policy Editor

Image source, AP

Over the weekend, I wrote a blogpost on the perils of the Tory plan to sell Lloyds Banking Group. In short, bank shares are tricksy financial products to own. And if a lot of people with modest savings have invested in the bank, it would make make it politically harder to do the right thing with Lloyds if there is another financial crisis that knocks a hole in its balance sheet.

Image source, PA

Why is the SNP manifesto launch so late?

Labour launched their manifesto a week ago. So why have the SNP held their own launch back? Well, it's pretty simple. Postal votes.

The first postal votes land on doorsteps up and down the country today. There were nearly 800,000 Scottish voters registered for postal votes in last year's referendum - one in five voters.

So the plan is to have Nicola Sturgeon all over the airwaves and front pages just as the first votes of this election are cast.

They know that the more voters they can get out - particularly while the polls are looking good (and they are looking very good for the SNP) - the better. You can't fault the logic.

Chris Cook
Newsnight Policy Editor

Image source, Press Association

This morning, there are several reports that the SNP is pondering whether it could block a Labour minority government from pressing ahead on the renewal of Trident.

The SNP can influence, it can cut deals and, of course, Labour will not want to be seen to ignore Scotland. It is also not in anyone’s interest for there to be relentless negotiation. I assume some sort of deal would be concluded up front.

But if that does not happen or a deal breaks down, the SNP's ability to force concessions on issues such as Trident is perhaps not as strong as it first looks. This morning's newspaper coverage confirms that suspicion to me.

Stewart Hosie, the deputy leader, has said the SNP might “vote against or table amendments to estimates”. It’s worth understanding what that means. Here are a few things worth knowing about the way that our parliament works:

1. Only the Treasury may introduce spending proposals. So backbenchers and the opposition aren’t allowed to lard up bills with pork. MPs may only amend spending bills to cut the amounts pledged in them.
2. The way that public cash gets handed on to departments is through a process known as “the estimates”. That’s what Mr Hosie was talking about. They usually go into legislation through what are known as Supply and Appropriation bills.
3. Erskine May, the constitutional handbook, says these supply bills can be sliced into chunks. And only the Treasury can propose spending bills, so opposition MPs cannot re-amalgamate them. Oppositions can only cut the totals proposed or vote them down.

So how about this?

A Labour Treasury could split the supply bill in two and defence spending could be hived into its own standalone slug of legislation, which would be voted on first. This sort of division would allow the SNP to abstain on Trident then pass the rest.

What if the SNP sought to play hardball?

In the event that the SNP sought to vote Trident spending down, the nationalists would have to contend with two problems. First, they would not have the votes to propose some specific bar on funding for Trident from the bill: there is a strong pro-Trident majority in parliament.

So their best hope would be shooting down the whole defence budget bill. But winning that vote would mean they would be open to the accusation that they are cutting off the budget lines that pays for salaries for soldiers and pensions for veterans. Would that be politically wise?

Second, even then, the SNP would need to get the Tories to vote with them. That seems unlikely. The Conservatives are unionists and we are talking about defence. It is an area of policy where lots of Tories feel that they have a particular historic responsibility and strength.

The Tories could perhaps justify voting down a defence supply bill on procedural grounds. But it is worth remembering that oppositions can cause mischief by supporting governments: David Cameron made hay by backing the 2006 Education Act, for example.

If that defence bill passed, would the SNP then be brave enough to start trying to vote down the next supply bill? For the NHS? For welfare? For the Scottish block grant? Would they vote down Budget resolutions? Or the Finance Bill? And, again, would they get the Tories to vote with them on this effort?

If the SNP could force concessions out of Labour through such a ferocious approach, would an alliance with the Conservatives against Labour shore up support in Scotland?

And, at that point, they would be very near to bringing down the whole government. Labour could make these bills into confidence issues. At that point, the SNP's problem is that their best weapon would be to bring down the whole government - too devastating a weapon to fire on almost any single topic.

How appropriate that this argument should revolve around nuclear weapons.

p.s. Colin Talbot, a professor at Manchester, has reached a similar conclusion via slightly different reasoning, external.