Caroline Curry, the mother of victim Liam Curry, is making a statement now on behalf of her family and Lisa and Mark Rutherford, parents of Chloe Rutherford.

Liam, 19, and his girlfriend Chloe Rutherford, 17, were among 22 people killed in the Manchester Arena bomb attack.

Curry starts by thanking those involved in the inquiry.

All the families have asked for is the truth and acknowledgement of failures, she says, and determination that those failures are fixed.

She says she hopes no other families will ever have to go through the heartbreak they experienced.

She says didn't get that acknowledgment from anyone other than the Greater Manchester Fire Rescue Service until the chairman's report was published.

"Shame on you all," she says.

The chairman of the inquiry, Sir John Saunders, has now finished speaking and we're expecting statements from the family members of victims soon.

Stay tuned as we continue to bring you updates.

Daniel De Simone
Reporting from Manchester

The chairman’s conclusions in relation to MI5 are devastating - not only does he find the attack might have been prevented had different steps been taken, but he also rejects the service’s expert conclusion about no-one other than Salman and Hashem Abedi being knowingly involved in the attack.

Sir John suggests that MI5’s position was out of step with the experience of its officers.

The secret hearings are credited with allowing the inquiry to question MI5 staff directly involved in the decision-making about Salman Abedi, rather than merely a senior corporate witness.

This latter approach has previously happened in inquests for previous terror attacks.

He says it became apparent that MI5’s corporate position did not reflect what the relevant officers did, thought or would have done at the time.

Rather, the corporate position was more a “retrospective justification for the actions taken or not taken”.

Judith Moritz
Reporting from Manchester

It seems a contradiction of the term "public inquiry" to keep some findings private, but Chairman Sir John Saunders says he had to balance the principle of open justice with the issue of national security.

He’s added that all private evidence has been scrutinised, to make sure that restricting it can’t be seen as a "cloak to cover up mistakes".

Given that the previous two inquiry reports were highly critical of the private companies and public authorities involved with the arena and the emergency response, this document was also expected to be tough on MI5.

Bereaved families and survivors will be pleased that in some areas, the report doesn’t pull its punches.

They’ll find it upsetting to hear that the security service missed a significant opportunity.

But there will also be some frustration that they’ll never learn the full detail of exactly what that opportunity involved.

"What an appalling loss which was so unnecessary," Sir John says, paying tribute to those who were killed.

He goes on to pay tribute to emergency service workers and the city of Manchester - as well as survivors and bereaved families.

He says he will have raised more questions for the bereaved families in his report - "I am sorry, but that was inevitable" - but reiterates that some findings cannot be reported publicly.

His comments come to a close soon after these words.

Sir John thanks those involved in helping him put together the report - a "very onerous task".

He says he has been greatly impressed by people wanting to make a difference.

"Some of the evidence has been inspirational, showing humanity at its best.

"Some of it... has shown humanity at its worst."

He adds that some of the testimony has been "gruelling and distressing to listen to" and people will be affected for the rest of their lives.

Sir John is now talking about whether the attack could have been prevented.

"I have found a significant missed opportunity to take action that might have prevented the attack," he says.

He goes on to add: "It is not possible to reach any conclusion as to whether the attack would have been prevented."

But he says there is "realistically a possibility" that "actionable intelligence might have been obtained" that could have prevented the attack.

Reasons included the failure of the security service to act swiftly enough, he says.

Sir John Saunders is still speaking and stresses he is "confident" that the police and CPS will take appropriate action if evidence comes to light of the involvement of others in attacks like this.

He then moves on to the question of preventability and whether security services could have acted to stop the attack.

Image source, .

Sir John now talks about how the brothers prepared for the attack.

He refers to how the brothers made use of an instructional video put on the internet by so-called Islamic State.

He says its important for the authorities to make sure "instructions for murder such as these" are not put on the internet in the future.

Speaking of the chemicals used in bomb-making, he says: "Unusual purchases need to be reported promptly.

"None of the brothers' own purchases were reported to the others."

If they had he says: "It is possible that Salman Abedi could have been stopped."

We're still hearing from Sir John, who is now talking about the Didsbury Mosque in Manchester.

He says it's "unlikely" that Salman Abedi was radicalised at the mosque.

But he says it looks like the mosque was trying to distance itself from the family “in a way which I did not accept was accurate”.

The mosque "could have been more helpful in enabling me to get to the truth", he says.

Judith Moritz and Daniel De Simone
Reporting from Manchester

The report looks at two pieces of intelligence received by MI5 in the months before the attack.

Salman Abedi arrived in Manchester from Libya on 18 May 2017 and headed straight from the airport to a car which had been used to store explosives.

The chairman says MI5 action could have led to Abedi being followed to the car.

He states that, having considered CCTV evidence showing how Abedi behaved around the vehicle, he finds that, in the event MI5 had successfully followed him, “the attack might have been prevented”.

The chairman concludes the second piece of intelligence “gave rise to the real possibility of obtaining information that might have led to actions which prevented the attack".

In relation to the first piece of intelligence, he finds it was not passed on by an MI5 officer accompanied by sufficient contextual detail and, had this happened, it is likely that further investigative steps would have been taken in relation to Salman Abedi.

The chairman finds it is impossible to say whether or not the investigative steps that are likely to have been taken arising from the first piece of intelligence, with further context, would have revealed the bomb plot, but there is a “material possibility” it would have led to investigators learning more about Salman Abedi’s activities.

The chairman states it is unlikely that such investigative steps would have uncovered the plot. However, he finds that if they had increased what was known about Salman Abedi, this would have increased the overall prospect of preventing the attack by reason of the second piece of intelligence.

Speaking on whether Abedi should have been referred to the Prevent scheme, which aims to stop people becoming terrorists, Sir John says: "I have concluded that he should have been."

He adds he heard Abedi was considered at one stage for the programme, but he was not considered suitable.

He said: "It is very hard to say what then might have happened."

Sir John now refers to other people who could have influenced Abedi's radicalisation. He says Abedi was exchanging with extremists about subjects such as martyrdom.

He says: "There is a learning point which could be usefully pursued."

Saunders now says he has "not been able to obtain a complete picture of the part the family played" in the radicalisation of the brothers.

He points out that their parents were "not willing to give evidence to the inquiry”.

Their brother, Ismail Abedi, managed to leave the UK so he didn't have to provide information to the inquiry, despite being requested to do so, Saunders says.

Image source, .

We are still hearing from Sir John Saunders, who says it is important to realise "violent Islamist extremists are a tiny group".

He adds "there were a number of contributory factors" to his radicalisation - his family background and parents' extremist views and participation in the struggle in Libya.

This played a "significant part", he says.

He suggests Abedi and his brother were likely to have come into contact with a number of "violent extremists" while in Libya.

Judith Moritz and Daniel De Simone
Reporting from Manchester

The inquiry’s findings on MI5 are damning.

Sir John Saunders details how, in the months before the attack, MI5 received two pieces of intelligence that were highly relevant to the plot.

The public report does not say what the intelligence was.

Much of MI5’s evidence to the inquiry was heard in secret for reasons of national security and the report is therefore limited in what it discloses.

The report finds that the first piece of intelligence should have been shared with Counter Terrorism Police, and that an MI5 officer should have written a report on the second piece of intelligence on the day they assessed it, but failed to do so.

The MI5 officer had, at the time, born in mind the possibility the information related to activity of “pressing national security concern”.

“In the context of national security, if there is a need to do something it is usually necessary to do it promptly,” the chairman states.

He finds the “delay in providing the report led to the missing of an opportunity to take a potentially important investigative action” which could have led to information which meant that Salman Abedi’s return to the UK before the attack would have been “treated extremely seriously” by MI5.

Image source, Manchester Arena Inquiry

Sir John goes on to say that it is important people "understand as much as we can" about the radicalisation of Abedi, so that "similar signs can be recognised and appropriate action can be taken".

He says: "It is also that we know in detail about the preparation of the attack so that measures can be brought that would have prevented the killers acquiring the knowledge and materials they needed to carry out the attack."

Judith Moritz and Daniel De Simone
Reporting from Manchester

In making his finding that Salman Abedi probably recieved assistance from someone in Libya, Sir John Saunders contradicts an MI5 assessment which said that no-one other than Salman Abedi and his brother Hashem were knowingly involved in the plot.

Sir John finds it is “more likely than not that there were others who were knowingly involved in plotting a bomb, even though they might not have known all the details”.

He states it is not possible, on the available evidence, to say who this might have been.

Following a minute's silence to remember those who died in the attack in 2017, inquiry chairman Sir John Saunders gives a summary of the findings of the third report.

Sir John says the third part of the report focuses on three things:

• the radicalisation of Salman Abedi
• the planning and preparation of the attack by Abedi and his brother
• whether the attack could have been prevented

Judith Moritz and Daniel De Simone
Reporting from Manchester

The security service MI5 missed a significant opportunity to take action that might have prevented the Manchester Arena bombing, a public inquiry has found.

The reasons for the missed chance included a “failure” by an MI5 officer to act swiftly enough.

Chairman Sir John Saunders also finds that the bomber Salman Abedi probably received assistance in the plot from someone in Libya.

It is the first time an official conclusion has been made about the possible involvement of other people abroad.