Image source, EPA

The inquiry's lead lawyer Hugo Keith KC continues with his line of questioning on the distinctions between the technical advice given by scientific advisers, and political decisions being made by ministers.

Asked if there were any good or easy outcomes, Whitty says there were two things to consider right from the beginning.

First, "there were no good options...all the options were very bad, some a bit worse, some very, very bad," he says.

"And the second was this was going to go on for a very long time" - which he said took time for some people to internalise.

This session of the inquiry next moves on to decision making structures in government and the imposition of pandemic restrictions.

Asked about the choice to lock down, Whitty says these were "very clearly political decisions" that only elected representatives could make in a democratic system.

He says experts can give advice to government about possible scenarios, but ultimately choices must be made by politicians.

On the political disputes that emerged about lockdown, Whitty says it was healthy and legitimate to have an open debate about the balance between public health restrictions and individual freedoms.

But he says he thought it was "not legitimate for people to essentially change the facts" to suit their own political agenda.

Keith, the inquiry's lead lawyer, continues to question Whitty about the models shown to the public early on in the pandemic.

"Models tended to become a way for both sides to have a debate," Whitty says.

"Models became a focus of debates because they were debatable, and not fully understood."

Whitty details how ministers heard scientific advicepublished at 12:25 Greenwich Mean Time 21 November 2023

12:25 GMT 21 November 2023

Helen Catt
Political correspondent

Professor Sir Chris Whitty’s evidence has given us a peek under the bonnet of how scientific advice actually got to ministers.

Firstly, pretty quickly: he said there were usually just a couple of hours between a meeting of scientists and the Cobra meetings which would receive that advice.

Secondly, pretty informally: it was often up to him and Sir Patrick Vallance to verbally relay the scientists’ deliberations to ministers because of the fast-moving nature of the pandemic.

He also gave his view on something which caused a bit of a furore at the time: having the former No 10 aide Dominic Cummings at Sage meetings.

He said he thought it was “perfectly reasonable” for him and others to attend - and said he didn’t see No 10 representatives attempting to "bias" the outcomes.

Hugo Keith KC, the inquiry's lead lawyer, asks Whitty whether Sage spent too much time on modelling scenarios in February 2020 instead of actual hospital data on infections.

Keith's questioning is focusing on Sage a lot at the moment - as a reminder, it's is a committee attended by scientists across a range of fields.

Whitty says data was just too sparse early on in the pandemic. He defends the usefulness of modelling as he says it allowed for the testing of some policy options.

Whitty adds that the models were in no way meant to be used as "predictions of the future".

Image source, PA Media

Whitty reveals that Dominic Cummings - Boris Johnson's top adviser during the pandemic - caused "quite a row" when he started sitting in on Sage meetings during the pandemic.

Whitty himself, however, feels it was "perfectly sensible that one of the most senior advisers to the prime minister... could listen in on Sage".

He adds that it would have been unacceptable for Cummings to attempt to influence Sage's discussions, which never happened.

Now back, we're looking at how the medical officers briefed government ministers on the discussions of Sage.

Sir Chris Whitty agrees with Hugo Keith KC that in general terms differences of opinion in Sage "were not, as a rule, reflected in the minutes".

He adds that what was provided to ministers was a "central view, not a consensus view" from the meetings.

Whitty adds that in most cases ministers were more reliant on the verbal outlines of Sage discussions, rather than reading the minutes themselves.

He adds that it "would depend from minister to minister".

'Treating the patient' in Covidpublished at 11:45 Greenwich Mean Time 21 November 2023

11:45 GMT 21 November 2023

Jim Reed
Health reporter, BBC News

Image source, Crown Copyright

It's interesting that Sir Chris Whitty has - twice in the first part of the session - used the same analogy to explain the advice he gave to ministers in the spring of 2020.

He compared the country to a hospital patient and said it was important to explain the downsides of Covid restrictions in the same way a sick patient would be told in advance that surgery carries risks.

"That is good medical practice," he told the inquiry.

"It doesn't mean you do not think the action should occur... but [ministers] needed to be aware of the downsides."

He was asked if he ever felt he was overstepping the mark by addressing policy questions outside of his expertise.

He said if lock down restrictions could cause loneliness, depression or force someone into poverty, then that became a clinical or public health problem and part of his remit.

Questions about the wider economy though were, he said, "not for me".

The short break is over and Sir Chris Whitty has returned to give more evidence.

Stay with us while we bring you testimony from the government's most senior medcial adviser during the pandemic.

You can also watch proceedings live by pressing the Play button at the top of this page.

Image source, PA Media

The inquiry is taking a short tea break after almost an hour and a half of questions on the early response to Covid in the UK - and Professor Sir Chris Whitty's role in its delivery.

Here's a look at the key lines so far:

• Whitty tells the the inquiry he took the lead role in responding to Covid in late January
• He dismissed claims that there was tension with Professor Sir Patrick Vallance at the time - and that any differences in approach they had were "small"
• Whitty urged care in exaggerating any such differences - and accompanying suggestions he was the more cautious of the two
• In balancing the risk of introducing social measures either too early or too late, he conceded that "we went a bit too late on the first wave"
• He added that it became clear by mid-March that the UK would be "in very deep trouble" if it did not take action
• Whitty also rejected the characterisation that he warned the government against "overreacting"
• In February 2020, he said it would have been wrong to swing the whole medical profession to Covid
• On Sage - the board that provides advice to support government decision makers during emergencies - Whitty said it was too small to begin with, before becoming "arguably" too large

Image source, Crown Copyright

Just before the inquiry took a break, Whitty said that in February 2020 Sage had not considered the idea of a lockdown

The advisory group did, however, float a restriction of mixing between households and individuals.

Whitty said lockdown would have been a "radical proposition to put to government" and it is "debatable" whether it is the job of a group of scientists to ever suggest a measure like that.

Inquiry Chair Baroness Hallett has adjourned the questioning of Sir Chris Whitty until 11:40

Stay with us while we bring you the latest revelations and analysis of what we've heard so far this morning.

Sir Chris Whitty is asked about the makeup of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (Sage) and whether it was diverse enough across scientific disciplines to deal with the pandemic.

Whitty has accepted the initial group of people meeting to discuss Covid was too small - but that it then got too large making it difficult to challenge each other.

He said Sage was "not a fixed body", even during times of emergencies, because people come in and leave depending on necessity and availability.

Managing Covid and lockdown a difficult balancepublished at 11:11 Greenwich Mean Time 21 November 2023

11:11 GMT 21 November 2023

Nick Triggle
Health Correspondent

Sir Patrick Vallance’s catchphrase as the pandemic progressed became “go hard, go early”. But it is clear that is not a belief England chief medical officer Professor Sir Chris Whitty entirely shares.

He has told the inquiry that the idea you can introduce restrictions early without cost is wrong – you can go both too soon and too late.

He said he was more focussed than some of the scientists advising government on the indirect health impacts – the fact restricting freedoms has an impact on things like mental health, deprivation, education and wellbeing. This is understandable – his role includes responsibility for public health.

He said managing the virus and the consequences of lockdown were “two difficult things to balance”.

He concedes – as he has done before – that the country went too late for the first lockdown.

But his testimony clearly illustrates why it is wrong to see this as all about how the government could have better suppressed the virus.

The counsel to the inquiry, Hugo Keith KC, continues by asking Whitty about how he addressed the virus with the medical profession in early 2020.

In discussing a presentation he gave to the Royal College of Physicians on 12 February 2020, Whitty says he told them "yes we've got to act, but also this could go either way".

Whitty says that at this point it was "important to recognise it would have been wrong to swing the whole medical profession to Covid".

He adds that during the pandemic there were more non-Covid related deaths than deaths due to the virus.

Image source, Crown Copyright

Keith is not letting up - he asks Whitty again about reports he warned the government of "overreacting" in the early days of the pandemic.

"I’ve rejected and I will continue to reject your characterisation of 'overreacting'," Whitty tells Keith, firmly.

Whitty says the position of himself and the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (Sage) was "if you wish to avoid loss of life you need to act".

However, Sage also made clear the downsides of taking action by imposing measures like lockdowns, Whitty says.

Sir Chris Whitty is asked whether his concern - he was quoted as saying that "overreacting will have impact" - influenced the advice he gave the government.

Whitty says that it became clear by mid-March that the country would be "in very deep trouble" if it did not act.

He said he took the same position of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (Sage) from 16 March, that in wanting to avoid a loss of life, they would have to implement measures.

Keith pushes Whitty again on the differences between the approaches by him and Vallance.

He notes that both Vallance in his diaries, and Farrar in his book, referred to Whitty's tendencies "to be more cautious" and "to see what the data tells us".

Whitty responds by saying he thinks "we should be very careful of the narcissism of small differences here", adding again that they were "small".

He adds that he was "very aware" that there were two things needed to be balanced - "the risk of going early [into lock down or other similar measures], and the risk of going too late".

"My view is, with the benefit of hindsight, we went a bit too late on the first wave," Whitty says.

Whitty is now asked about supposed tensions between him and his fellow leading adviser during the pandemic, Sir Patrick Vallance.

Hugo Keith KC notes that in his book about the UK's Covid response, Sir Jeremy Farrar, a leading British scientist, says Vallance and Whitty were split between “waiting and wading in” when Covid first emerged in the country.

Whitty responds that Farrar “had a book to sell and that made it more exciting”.

"The differences were extremely small," Whitty insists.

The counsel to the inquiry tells Whitty that there was some criticism as to whether the UK government failed to liaise with foreign nations on their approach to tackling the Covid pandemic.

Whitty rejects the claim, saying that he and his colleagues were "absolutely dependent" on information from international scientist and specialists.

Whitty said he met with the Director-General of the World Health Organization who also organised group meetings with international clinicians to pass on information in an "efficient way".