Beer says the inquiry has heard from people junior to van den Bogerd who say it was Post Office staff at her level asserting that Horizon was a secure system.

Van den Bogerd says she is among the most junior on distribution lists to such messages, and as such wouldn't have challenged those claims.

We then turn to two meetings with MPs in 2012 – including one where Paula Vennells said there was an issue of "temptation" among postmasters but that the "Post Office brand was paramount".

Van den Bogerd says she was not involved in briefing Vennells or Alice Perkins (who was also present) for this meeting, and that her involvement remained "only in my specific slot on the agenda, as it were."

She is asked if there was a deliberate strategy to put the idea of temptation in MP's minds, but she says she doesn't think so.

Beer says this was the strategy that the Post Office maintained largely until she left. Van den Bogerd disagrees with this.

She says she tried to get "under the skin" of what happened in branches and investigate those cases.

Beer now moves ahead to 2011, and the changes made within the Post Office that year.

He reads off a document on the screen about the response to challenges regarding Horizon, saying that a "co-ordinated response plan" was the most pragmatic way to deter future challenges.

"Why was that the proposed approach?" he asks.

"I don't actually know," van den Bogerd replies.

He asks why the Post Office didn't instead have a policy of examining any challenges on their own merits.

"Well it should have," she says, and concedes that this is a "very biased view".

Why didn't anyone challenge this "biased" advice, Beer asks.

Van den Bogerd replies that everyone copied into the email was very senior, and she doesn't recall anyone challenging the guidance.

Why was the onus on postmasters to prove their innocence, rather than the Post Office to prove their guilt, Beer asks.

"I think back then the assumption was that if there was a loss in the branch that it was the responsibility of the postmaster," she says.

Beer notes that there is a lot of assuming going on.

"Absolutely, I agree," van den Bogerd replies.

He asks why a multi-million pound company company would make assumptions when the postmaster contract sets out the terms of when postmasters needed to repay shortfalls.

She says that was the advice received from the legal team at Royal Mail.

Beer now asks why something was not done to investigate issues with Horizon raised at this time.

She says she thinks it was down to the particular geographical area this complaint from Mrs Pugh came from, Chester.

She says she thought the regional team should have been responsible.

When pressed on why things were done like this, van den Bogerd says: "It depends on the people in those areas in terms of level of support given to sub-postmasters at the time."

More now on "rumblings", as Beer pulls up more email exchanges from 2004.

He highlights a case where a postmistress claimed that Horizon was causing problems. Is this in the category of "rumblings"? Beer asks.

"Yes," van den Bogerd says, but clarifies that she considered it a "routine request for information" at the time.

She is asked what happened after this postmistress raised concerns about Horizon, to which she replies: "I don't know what happened after this."

"Should this have triggered a full investigation?" Beer asks.

Van den Bogerd concedes that "it should have been done". She adds that she's not sure if it should have been an independent investigation, but says there wasn't a "function that did that back then".

Jason Beer KC now asks van den Bogerd about an email she sent to Mr Morgan, in which she asks him to either provide evidence to support his claim or to "make good the loss".

She is asked if she sought to understand the root cause of the discrepancy.

Van den Bogerd says back in 2004 there wasn't a facility to investigate branch issues. It was down to the postmaster to provide evidence to "dispute the loss" at their branch.

She is asked how a postmaster could do this if they didn't have access to the computer system.

She says the postmaster would have had limited access to the system. She says she did what she could.

Beer returns to van den Bogerd's awareness of "general rumblings" of complaints about bugs within the Post Office.

She says she was aware of these rumblings from around 2010, but adds there had been "some postmasters saying that it must be the system. But not that I could have put my finger on at the time."

Beer displays two emails from 2004 which talk about a sub-postmaster raising a concern about possible issues with the Horizon system.

"Does this fall into the category of a rumbling?" Beer asks.

Van den Bogerd says the concerns were raised in 2004, but that she didn't know "where to go".

Asked if this was an "early rumbling", she says yes.

When asked what was done after this, she replies that there was "nothing in the logs" that suggested Horizon was to blame.

Image source, Post Office Inquiry

Beer next asks van den Bogerd about her role in the 'Second Sight' investigation.

She says she wasn't the lead, but was "there to help", and adds that everyone's roles in the investigation evolved over time.

He then asks whether she considered the impact of the revelation that there were bugs in the system on the criminal prosecution of sub-postmasters.

"No, I didn't," she replies.

She says she knew there was a security investigation team and knew that the Post Office was bringing prosecutions, but that she was "reassured that everything was done in line with the code of prosecutors".

Other than that, she says, she had no insight.

The former senior Post Office director is quizzed about a third problem with the system. She says she was only aware of two bugs at the time.

When pressed on this, she says regarding the third bug: "We should have asked if there were more."

But she says she wasn't involved in these discussions.

Beer asks if there was a post-mortem about when Post Office knew about the bugs. She says she was not aware of one taking place.

"I wasn't involved in these conversations," she says.

Beer continues pressing van den Bogerd over the email.

He asks her whether she was aware that Fujitsu had formally notified the Post Office of the receipts and payments mismatch in October 2010.

"I was not aware of that," she replies.

She adds that she was also not aware of a meeting between Fujitsu and the Post Office in October 2010 to discuss the bug.

She says she learned of this in 2013.

Beer then asks van den Bogerd if she was aware of discussions taking place in 2013 among management at the Post Office as to how high up in the organisation knowledge of this bug had gone.

"No," van den Bogerd replies.

"Did you seek to ascertain which departments or who knew about the bug?"

"No," she replies.

"Why not?" Beer presses.

She says that it was presented as a "routine" problem, and she didn't push any further.

Image source, Post Office Inquiry

We are now looking at van den Bogerd's witness statement, in which she says she only became "formally" aware of bugs and defects within the Horizon system in 2013.

Prior to this, the statement says she was aware of "rumblings" of complaints about the system.

Beer points her to the email we saw this morning where issues were noted.

She maintains that she can't recall seeing this email at the time.

Beer asks if she is "shutting" her mind to receiving these emails because "you know the difficulty this creates for you".

"Not at all," van den Bogerd replies. "I really can't remember seeing this at all."

The inquiry is back and Angela van den Bogerd, a former senior director in the Post Office, is still giving evidence.

Stay with us as we bring you the latest news lines and analysis.

And, as always, you can watch it live by pressing the large Play icon at the top of this page.

Van den Bogerd questioned on the scandal's key issuespublished at 13:49 British Summer Time 25 April

13:49 BST 25 April

Peter Ruddick
Business reporter

The big question of the morning - would Angela van den Bogerd apologise - was answered early on.

She said she was "truly sorry" for the devastation caused by wrongful convictions.

It was a moment. But for sub-postmasters it was likely little more than a moment.

Why? Because it was swiftly followed up by a qualification. That, despite apologising, she thought she "didn't knowingly do anything wrong and I would never knowingly do anything wrong."

Van der Bogerd was asked why she used "anomaly" instead of "bug" when talking about issues with the Horizon IT system. She admitted this was a way of trying to control the narrative. But she added it wasn't her decision.

On remote access, she admitted receiving an email about it but does not remember seeing it. Anyway, Horizon and its supplier Fujitsu were not her "domain", she said.

The strongest exchange was on the taped interview with a sub-postmistress and her husband.

Van der Bogerd knew remote access was possible but didn't disclose that in the interview - because technically the Post Office couldn't and only Fujitsu could.

Are these qualifications fair? The inquiry chair will decide. But they are unlikely to be enough for the victims of this scandal.

Another bit of evidence before the break.

Van den Bogerd was asked to point to any occasion in which she corrected the messaging about there being no possibility of remotely accessing Horizon.

"I can't recall doing such an email," van den Bogerd replied.

This came about after the inquiry looked at internal communications outlining pre-approved messaging to respond to claims of remote access.

The inquiry is shown one which describes the idea that Horizon does not accurately record branch transactions as "imprecise".

Van den Bogerd had pointed to this in her witness statement, but questioned now says that this was not the final version.

She's asked where the final version is, and replied that it would have been in comms messaging.

Asked what she means, she said there is a disconnect between some of the information this morning (some of which she remembers, some she doesn't) and messaging inside the Post Office.

"I've missed some stuff coming through here," she said.

And with that, the inquiry took its break for lunch.

Before the break, Jason Beer KC showed a brief for van den Bogerd to prepare for "hard hitting" questions to be aired in a 2015 BBC Panorama episode titled 'Trouble at the Post Office'.

The episode was meant to be about an alleged miscarriage of justice within the Post Office.

Beer read out the key messages that van den Bogerd was meant to convey:

1. This is about missing money, which the Post Office has a duty to protect
2. The Post Office does not control the legal process, and does not prosecute without evidence
3. There's nothing wrong with the computer system

Beer asked van den Bogerd if she thought the mediation scheme and Second Sight investigation revealed that the majority of losses were down to human error and dishonesty, and not due to Horizon.

"Our investigations didn't find there was there was any evidence of losses caused by Horizon's system and that's what Second Sight concluded as well," she said.

Was the Post Office trying to avoid answering any questions about whether remote access was possible? Beer probed.

"I don't believe so," replied van den Bogerd.

Emma Simpson
Reporting from the inquiry

Image source, Pool

When did Angela van den Bogerd first become aware that sub-postmasters' accounts could be accessed remotely and what did she do about it?

We’ve heard that she was copied into an email as far back as December 2010 when a colleague highlights how Fujitsu can put an entry into a branch account remotely.

It came up as possible solution to a bug which had been affecting 60 branches. But van den Bogerd doesn’t remember seeing it.

In her witness statement she says she was first made aware that Fujitsu employees could, in theory, have remote access without sub-postmasters knowing the following year after receiving an email.

But she never mentioned this in her evidence to the High Court in 2018.

Jason Beer KC has been trying to unravel the contradictions: "What you said was false?"

“At the time I didn’t think it was,” she said.

And we haven’t even started with all the denials she and the Post Office gave to the BBC Panorama team in 2015 as they tried to pressure journalists and supress what was really going on.

The inquiry has now adjourned for lunch. It will return at around 14:00 BST.

But stay with us while we bring you the latest evidence and analysis from this morning's session.

Image source, Post Office Inquiry

Looking now to an email from Jessica Barker to multiple people, including van den Bogerd, in 2014.

It's about a draft report from Second Sight about what they were planning to say about a specific case.

In the email we see Belinda Crowe, programme director for Project Sparrow, asks whether this is the first report that references remote access, and says they need to "pick this up very robustly".

Crowe adds it appears they were asking for proof from the PO about Horizon.

Melanie Corfield, from the communications, replies to the email telling staff the PO's current line on remote access is: "This is not and never has been possible."

Beer says to Van den Borgen: "You knew that was false from multiple sources by now didn't you?"

"Yes," she tells the inquiry.

"It didn't register with me at the time," she says, but now she can see this is clearly false.

Beer says "we've seen a slew of emails now" that told her Fujitsu could remotely access individual transaction and change them. "Why wouldn't you put your hand up?" he asks.

"I just can't recall. To me, it couldn't have registered with me," she says as the messaging was constantly changing.

Pressed on this, Beer asks if the objective of the PO was to hide the remote access issue.

"I was certainly not trying to cover up or suppress," she says.

We're now being shown a document from April 2014, which indicates Fujitsu could have remote access to sub-postmasters' accounts.

Van den Bogerd is asked to confirm this.

"You would agree that this is Fujitsu saying that Fujitsu can insert branch transaction data?," counsel to the inquiry Jason Beer asks.

"Yes," she tells the inquiry.

Van den Bogerd goes on to confirm that Fujitsu could do this without consent from sub-postmasters.

Later, she is asked why the Post Office failed to include more information to Second Sight on what was known at that stage about remote access, alongside other findings.

"It should have, it should have been put into this," she tells the inquiry.