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In addition to the 2010 and 2011 emails, just before the break, Angela van den Bogerd was shown another from April 2014 that details Fujitsu having remote access to Horizon - this one comes from her own request for information after yet another sub-postmaster alleges interference in his Post Office accounts.

Beer asks whether van den Bogerd revealed this when she gave evidence to the High Court years later.

She says she did not.

"Did you forget about this email, too?" Beer asks, noting that she told the High Court she had only learned about the Fujitsu access a year before giving evidence.

Van den Borgerd stands by it, saying that the first formal notification of it came the year before she gave evidence, and that she had given evidence to the High Court based on what she understood to be true at the time.

The inquiry is now back from its short break.

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Before the break, Jason Beer KC continued asking van den Bogerd about remote access.

Going back to 2013, Beer showed a briefing note for Paula Vennells about Second Sight's review into Horizon.

The document highlights that two anomalies were voluntarily communicated to Second Sight by the Post Office, one of which, the '62 Branch Anomaly', first appeared in 2010.

Van den Bogerd was asked who is responsible for the summary of the '62 Branch Anomaly'.

She said it was likely the Post Office's IT specialist Simon Baker, and confirms that she did not contribute to it.

Van den Bogerd added that she "doesn't recall" seeing it before this particular briefing note.

After being pressed, she said that Baker was pulling it together and would have been best placed to have this information.

"I'm sorry I can't answer anything further than that," she said.

The inquiry is on a short break, we'll be catching you up with some of the key points raised in the first part of the morning session.

Stay with us.

Talking now about the group litigation, Jason Beer KC asks van den Bogerd if she had to take part in any disclosure exercises, such as looking at emails.

Beer specifically asks about emails from December 2010 and January 2011.

"No," she says. "I think the disclosure exercise was done within the business," but she was not asked to do it herself.

And when asked if she did it herself outside of disclosure, for the purposes of preparing her witness statement and evidence, she says "no" again.

"I wish I had, but I didn't," she says, adding that she couldn't remember most of the emails. "I don't remember the December emails and I wouldn't have even known where to look for that."

She is asked why she didn't try and look them up to prepare for court. "I didn't think it was relevant... I just didn't give it a thought."

But in preparation for today, Beer says it looks like she has looked up evidence to be ready.

Asked why she is treating this inquiry differently, she says "I had a list of questions to consider," and knew what to expect this time.

We're now in November 2018, and Van den Bogerd is being asked whether she knew about the possibility of inserting transactions - remotely in the Horizon computer system - and for how long.

She says she "still can't put a date" on balancing transactions claims.

Later, van den Bogerd was asked whether she had any contact with Gareth Jenkins or Fujitsu ahead of submitting her High Court witness statement.

She tells the inquiry she cannot remember whether or not she spoke to Jenkins while preparing her statement. Pressed on whether she's met him before, van den Bogerd says: "No, I've never met Gareth Jenkins".

Jenkins' name has been mentioned several times throughout this inquiry. He is a former chief IT architect at Fujitsu, the company that developed the Horizon computer system.

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The inquiry continues to discuss the transcript of the 2011 meeting between van den Bogerd and married sub-postmasters Val and Rachpal Athwal.

Van den Bogerd told them she'd "satisfied myself" that there was no issue with the system because she'd seen information it was down to a user at the branch who had a password to access the system, and "nobody else could have done that".

Jason Beer KC asks why she didn't reveal that she knew on the basis of emails that Fujitsu could remotely access the system.

She repeats that she doesn't remember receiving the initial email telling her that the system could be remotely accessed.

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Still on the meeting between the subpostmistress and her husband, Rachpal and Val Athwal, the inquiry is shown a section of the record of the meeting in which things get heated.

Athwal is arguing with Kevin Gilliland, one of the directors, about whether figures in the Horizon system can be manipulated remotely.

Van den Bogerd interjects to assure Athwal that it is not possible for anyone in the Post Office to change figures remotely, but does not mention that it is possible for those in Fujitsu to.

Pressed on why, she says she couldn't recall seeing the email a month earlier that revealed that information.

"You're telling us that you don't recall it because you know that the email of the 5 December 2010 presents you with a problem," Beer asserts.

"No, not at all, I wish I had remembered that information," Van den Bogerd replies.

Van den Bogerd is shown an email she had received from Tracy Marshall, an agent development manager, in 2011 - which shows it was possible for Fujitsu to remotely access branch accounts.

She is subsequently asked about an interview she had with a sub-postmistress who had been suspended over an "unexplained loss" of £700. "What was that interview for?" asks Beer.

Van den Bogerd replies that it was to re-establish the relationship between the sub-postmistress and the Post Office.

Beer points out that the meeting was tape recorded, and asks why.

"I don't know actually, it wasn't typical that we would've recorded these types of meetings," van den Bogerd replies.

Beer presses, saying the sub-postmistress's husband expressed he was not happy with the meeting being recorded.

"That wasn't my decision, and it was something we didn't normally do," she replies.

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Just before the break, Beer asked van den Bogerd why there weren't more records on a board meeting from October 2010.

In a list of attendees shown to the inquiry, six members of the Post Office are listed as present. She is asked whether she would have had responsibility for those meetings.

No, is her response.

But when pressed on how an additional record on Fujitsu and Horizon had not made its way to her, she says that at that time she was not involved.

"This wasn't my domain at all," she tells the inquiry, adding that it was only when Second Sight came into the businesses that she started to look into "this type of issue".

Before the break Jason Beer KC pressed van den Bogerd on the 2010 email. He asked her how she's able to say positively she didn't see it.

Van den Boger said she doesn't remember seeing it, and the "way it's constructed is really strange and I think that I would have remembered that at the time".

Beer asked the ex-Post Office executive if she reads her emails.

"Yeah, normally," she responded.

He asked if there would any reason for her not to have read an email, to which she replied: "Volume of work".

She went on to say she tended to read and respond to all her emails.

"This is what strikes me as odd, because I didn't respond to this one," van der Boger added.

We're back in the hearing room at the Post Office Inquiry - where counsel Jason Beer KC has resumed his questioning of former senior executive Angela van den Bogerd.

Stay with us as we bring you live coverage throughout the day as we hear what she knew about the IT issues which led to the Post Office scandal.

You can also stream the hearing by pressing the Play button in the big picture at the top of this page.

The inquiry is on a 10-minute break, we'll be catching you up with some of the key points raised in the first part of the morning session.

Stay with us.

We're hearing more about an email chain with Lynn Hobbs, which refers to the Ismay report.

Van den Bogerd is quick to stress that Hobbs was her senior, and the email did not express a sense of urgency she would expect if Hobbs was "really concerned" about what she'd heard.

Rod Ismay wrote a report into Horizon, which suggested there was "no backdoor" into the IT system. Van den Bogerd confirms this, as well as confirming that the report suggested the ownership of accounting was at branch level - rendering remote access improbable.

But we know that's not the case, as the faulty computer system led to several shortfalls and prosecutions of wrongly accused sub-postmasters.

And as we reported a little earlier, a 2010 email shown to the inquiry indicates van den Bogerd was made aware that Fujitsu can put an entry into a branch account remotely.

Van den Bogerd is asked about key findings that it was possible to remotely access the Horizon IT system.

The landmark Bates v Post Office High Court case argued that the real cause of missing cash was not theft but flaws with Horizon or failed attempts by Fujitsu to correct system errors remotely.

The inquiry is shown an email sent in 2010 by Lynn Hobbs, general manager of the Post Office's support network.

Hobbs wrote that she had found out that Fujitsu could put an entry into a branch account remotely, but the Post Office could not, which counsel to the inquiry Jason Beer KC calls "very significant".

"Yes, but prior to this, I would have had no awareness of any of this stuff (remote access)," van der Bogerd says, to which Beer adds that this makes it even more significant.

"I don’t recall seeing this email... it's quite a strange note dropped into an email chain."

Beer now asks if, in an email sent to her on 5 December 2010, van den Bogerd had been given information that Fujitsu can put an entry into a branch account remotely.

In response, she says yes.

Beer then turns to van den Bogerd's witness statement, external, where she says that pre-2011, she had no knowledge of the ability of Fujitsu employees to alter transaction data or data in branch accounts without the knowledge or consent of sub-postmasters.

"But that's not right, is it?" he asks her, adding that she saw it in the 2010 email.

She says she doesn't remember seeing that email, and without seeing it as part of the inquiry, she'd have no knowledge.

Van den Bogerd is now being asked about an email sent to her in 2011 from Emily Springford, a principal lawyer in dispute resolution. She tells the inquiry, when asked, that she had never met Springford before.

The distinction between marked and unmarked communication is one of the crunch points in the back and forth between van den Bogerd and counsel to the inquiry Jason Beer KC.

She says she wanted to ensure her team were looped in on specific requirements from Springford, and making sure they treated the guidance as a priority.

Beer goes on to ask why she told her team to mark communications in relation to specific cases as "legally privileged and confidential" - which diverged from Springford's guidance.

Pressed on whether "all" communication needed to be marked as legally privileged and confidential, she says her intention was just to "pass on" Springford's requests, adding that she can't remember much else beyond that.

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Jason Beer KC continues to ask about the language used internally by the Post Office to discuss Horizon.

Van den Bogerd is asked about an email from Paula Vennells discussing the issues with Horizon,

Beer presses her on why words like "exceptions" or "anomalies" were used to describe Horizon's errors rather than language like "bug" or "defect".

Van den Bogerd says she didn't "think too much of it" at the time and believes she didn't use the word "exception".

"I don't know the technical characterisation for each words," she says.

She agrees words like "exception" or "anomaly" makes an idea sound strange or peculiar while "bug" sounds more routine.

Second Sight - the independent forensic accountants who played a key role in exposing the scandal - submitted a report on 8 July 2013 identifying computer bugs that raised doubts over the reliability of Horizon data used to prosecute sub-postmasters.

Van den Bogerd says she had no knowledge about bugs within Horizon until this report: "That was a surprise to me, I wasn't aware of those up until that point."

She is then questioned about adopting the word "anomaly" for describing bugs, errors or defects in the Horizon system.

"It was simply that that was the word used at the time," she says.

She's asked if she remembers a suggestion that the word anomalies should be used rather than bugs, errors and defects, to which she simply says: "No."

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"I didn't knowingly do anything wrong, and I wouldn't knowingly do anything wrong," van den Bogerd emphatically tells the inquiry.

She is asked whether she apologises for her role in the scandal, knowing what she knows now.

To which she replies: "I apologise for not getting to the answer more quickly, but with the evidence I had and with the parameters of my role at the time, I did the best I could, and to the best of my ability."

Instead, she blames Fujitsu for not being transparent.

A little earlier, van den Bogerd said she was "disillusioned" with the Post Office, and that's what prompted her to leave in 2020 - not the outcome of trials in 2019.

In 2019, the Post Office agreed to pay them £58m in compensation to former sub-postmasters wrongly prosecuted. Although much of the money went on legal fees.

Van den Bogerd said she felt disillusioned about the intent of the business, telling the inquiry: "We'd agreed with the settlement, and therefore we accept that's the position, and we should move on".

She confirmed that it was the position of the Post Office that prompted her to leave, adding that she felt "pigeon-holed into the litigation".

But, van den Bogerd added, she was asked to stay by Paula Vennells, because of her extensive knowledge of the business.