Mark Devenport
BBC News NI Political Editor

Friday 13th. Just before the ides of March.

The omens were all there for Sir Patrick Coghlin's inquiry into the Renewable Heat Incentive scandal to be a day of reckoning for Stormont in general, and Northern Ireland's First Minister Arlene Foster in particular.

But when it came to it, the report into the affair which brought the power-sharing executive down in 2017 seemed anti-climactic.

Read Mark's full blog post here.

Sir Patrick then talks about the "funding provided by the treasury" for the NI scheme which was "ususual in public expenditure terms".

He says risks were identified by an official in the Treasury to DETI in 2011 and while it was "an unconventional means for communication of such matters" there was an understanding and appreciation of those risks.

But he adds that "not enough was done to mitigate them".

"The funding position was not made clear in submissions and business cases, nor was it properly explained to DETI minister until late 2015," he adds.

"Given the volatile and demand led nature of scheme, and usual nature of funding and despite warnings of a need to stay within set budget, insufficient steps were taken to protect the RHI budget."

Sir Patrick says a report prepared for DETI by the consultancy firm CEPA (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates) recommended a tariff for some biomass boilers that was higher than the variable cost of heat production.

He says this should have led CEPA to recommend "tiering" of the subsidy.

"The failure to do so by CEPA was not picked up by or corrected by DETI and created a perverse incentive to produce excess heat whether there was a need for it or not" he says.

Sir Patrick moves to some of the panel's findings.

"The non-domestic Northern Ireland RHI scheme was a project too far for the Northern Ireland government," he says.

"While motivated by the laudable aim of encouraging" the use of renewable energy over fossil fuels, "a Northern Ireland stand alone scheme should never had been adopted," he says.

He adds that it was a "novel, technically complex and potentially volatile" scheme due to its "demand led nature and a wide range of variables, such as fluctuating fuel costs that could affect operation".

He says "these features made the scheme highly risky," but that these risks "were not sufficiently understood by all those who should have understood them in the Northern Ireland government, either at the outset or at any time during the life of the scheme".

He continues, that without "the necessary resources or capacity", DETI "should never have embarked on this novel or demand led scheme" and that it would have been "less exposed to risk" if it had participated in what became the GB scheme.

Image source, Pacemaker

The chairperson now turns to a brief summary of the content of the report - he says this is no substitute for reading the totality of the report.

It's divided into three volumes containing 55 chapters.

The report contains findings "some of which are critical of the actions or inactions of significant numbers of people and organisations in respect of the scheme".

Sir Patrick says the panel has been able to carry out its inquiry "without fear or favour and free from any external pressure".

He says the terms of reference of the inquiry were "were made as broad as possible" and were focused on "openness and transparency"

Sir Patrick talks about a statement made in 2017 by Mr Ó Muilleoir about the inquiry and its remit.

He says Mr Ó Muilleoir confirmed at that time that the "inquiry would extend beyond financial matters to questions of governance and probity," in an attempt to rebuild "what was said to be shattered confidence in the institutions".

He reiterates: "We have focused on those matters".

In the creation of the report, Sir Patrick says there have been 1.2m pages of evidence processed.

He says oral evidence was given over the course of 114 days - "inclusive of opening and closing statements".

Outlining the purpose of the inquiry, Sir Patrick says it was not to "determine any person's civil or criminal liability" but has been "an inquisitorial rather than adversarial exercise".

He says it's been focused on "facts rather than attributing blame".

He adds that the purpose and scope of the inquiry can be found in the terms of reference in the report, external, and on the inquiry website.

Image source, Pacemaker

Sir Patrick explains how the then Finance Minister Máirtín Ó Muilleoir announced the establishment of the independent inquiry to the assembly on 24 January 2017.

The RHI Inquiry began work on 1 February 2017.

The inquiry has considered 1.2m items of evidence and took oral evidence from witnesses over a period of 114 days.

The inquiry has been inquisitorial rather than adversarial, the chairperson explains.

If you want to read the RHI Inquiry report in full, you can find it here, external.

Sir Patrick turns to a number of "media interviews" that were conducted by Stephen Nolan of the BBC.

The first of which was with Jonathan Bell - who had been DETI minsiter from May 2015 to May 2016.

The second with Arlene Foster, who had been DETI minister "during the development and implementation of the RHI scheme from 2008 to May 2015," and subsequently became minister for finance and "latterly the first minster".

He describes the interviews as "politically explosive" as Mr Bell had alleged that "his desire to bring the scheme under control had been thwarted by DUP special advisers (SPADs)" and that Mrs Foster had "ordered him to keep the scheme open for an additional two weeks" but that he had wanted to close it due to over spending.

Sir Patrick adds that in Decmber 2016 Mrs Foster made a "formal statement to the assembly about the scheme and her involvement in it".

He adds that she "resolutely rejected the allegations made by Mr Bell and strongly maintained" that she had never been provided of any warning that scheme spending was out of control or that cost controls were urgently required.

Sir Patrick says this led to a "firestorm of political and media allegations and counter allegations" but that "one common feature appears to have been agreed," namely, the "desire for an independent investigation, free from political influence to establish the facts relating to the RHI scheme".

Sir Patrick outlines the importance of the BBC Spotlight documentary on RHI broadcast on 6 December 2016 - this was when the interest of the general public really became engaged, he adds.

He says it was a "well-presented and explained documentary" that simplified the auditor general's report for easy public understanding.

This was followed by a series of television interviews conducted by Stephen Nolan, the first with former DETI minister Jonathan Bell and the second with Arlene Foster who had been DETI minister during the development and implementation of the RHI schemes.

Sir Patrick outlines the background to the inquiry report.

He says that back in July 2016 the Comptroller and Auditor General, published a report dealing with the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) relating to resource accounts for the financial year 2015/16.

He says that report dealt "specifically" with the "development and performance of Northern Ireland's non-domestic renewable heat incentive scheme".

Sir Patrick outlines some of the findings in that report that found "systemic weaknesses" in existence from the beginning of the scheme.

He then says that the Public Accounts Committee decided in June 2016 that it would "conduct and investigation into what had gone wrong with the scheme" and used it's powers to call witnesses.

Image source, Pacemaker

Sir Patrick says it is the content of the report, the evidence summarised in it, its detailed findings and recommendations that are of central importance.

"They need to be considered in detail by our government, by those who can secure the changes that need to occur and also by our media," he adds.

Sir Patrick talks about the timing of the report's release.

He says "all interested parties" were made aware of the date two-to-three weeks ago.

He also highlights that the media was given access to the report a number of hours before his speech, "under certain confidentiality" arrangements.

However he emphasises, that "this launch event and this statement and how they might synchronise with the news cycle should not be the focus".

Sir Patrick goes on to talk about the location of the report's publication.

He says the panel "considered it important the launch took place in Stormont".

He outlines a number of reasons why, including that "all of our public hearings took place here", and that "so much of our work has involved scrutiny" of how devolved government has operated.

He finally adds: "Many, albeit not all, of those who need to read our report and secure the changes outline in recommendations are based here.

"Some may have preferred if we launched report elsewhere," says Sir Patrick, "we were convinced it should occur in this building".

Sir Patrick turns now to public speculation - "all of which is wrong" - that the report was published on a Friday afternoon in order to bury bad news.

He says Friday was the only day available due to assembly business.

Sir Patrick says it took a long time not only to analyse evidence, but to also gather both oral and written submissions and documents.

"We had to consider, weigh and asses the volume of documents we had received," he says.

After looking at the "totality of evidence" the panel compiled a draft report and engaged with the "representation process" - meaning those who were "likely to be criticised in the inquiry findings" were approached.

Sir Patrick says this happened from July to October 2019 and that responses were also received during this time.

The panel then considered the representations it received and took those points on board "where appropriate before finalising the report".