What does Daily's evidence tell us about prosecutions?published at 13:17 Greenwich Mean Time 23 January

13:17 GMT 23 January

Emma Simpson
Business correspondent, at the inquiry

Robert Daily is interesting as he gives us a glimpse into how prosecutions were pursued in Scotland, and the differences in procedure governing investigations compared with England and Wales.

For instance, in Scotland corroboration is required. In other words, prosecutors need two sources of evidence so couldn’t just rely on evidence from the Horizon computer system. But he’s admitted that there were no Scottish qualified lawyers working in the Post Office criminal law team until 2013 when external solicitors were instructed to give support.

He didn’t have formal training on disclosure obligations in Scotland until 2010, relying on “on-the-job” training in this key area before then.

The inquiry is now breaking for lunch and will return at 13:50 GMT.

Inquiry lawyer Emma Price asks whether Peter Holmes was clear in saying there had been problems with Horizon at his branch.

"Yes," replies Daily.

Price pulls up Daily's witness statement, where he says that he didn't take Holmes' complaints seriously because "I don't recall being aware of any issues with Horizon at the time".

The witness statement says checks had found no problems with Horizon at the Jesmond branch. But it is unclear what those checks consisted of, Price says.

Emily Atkinson
Live reporter, at the inquiry

We’re moving now to the prosecution of Peter Holmes – and ears have pricked in the public seats in front of me.

Holmes had been a manager at a Post Office branch in Jesmond, Newcastle.

He was accused of false accounting involving a £46,000 shortfall and was convicted in January 2010 - sentenced to a community order with a curfew for three months.

He died from a brain tumour aged 74, in 2015. Six years later, his conviction was overturned.

The inquiry is looking at a record of an interview Daily conducted with Holmes on 19 September 2008 regarding the alleged shortfall.

During the exchange, Holmes said he had no idea how the money went missing "unless it's the Horizon let us down".

He added: "I mean there's no one in there [in the branch that's] stolen [£]46,000. I haven't got it, it's not in my bank account."

Daily hardly speaks as the interview is read out. Only saying "yes" now and again to confirm a technical detail.

Daily is being asked about audit data, known technically as ARQ data (Audit Record Queries).

The inquiry lawyer asks if Daily ever requested this data after a Post Office employee suggested that Horizon was responsible for any shortfall?

"I don't recall," replies Daily. He adds that if there was a suggestion that the problem was Horizon, he would expect it to be taken up by the line manager and followed through with the Fujitsu IT firm.

Image source, .

A document showing objectives for the Post Office security team between 2013-2014 is on screen now.

The inquiry zones in on the third objective, which says: " To ensure a robust approach to fraud loss recovery with a return rate of 65%."

Activities for this include searches of the persons/premises, full engagement with police contacts and that "all intervention measures are adopted".

Daily is asked why the target to recover monetary losses was increased from 40% to 65%, to which he says he can only think it was because of the amount of losses the Post Office was suffering.

A record of Daily's performance review for 2013-2014 is then shown in which he said he "achieved an 86% recovery (£68,733) in my cases", and is asked if he was rewarded by the Post Office for meeting this objective.

Daily says recovering money was part of his objectives but it didn't affect him getting a bonus, which staff were awarded yearly regardless.

Daily goes on to say that individuals within the investigations team always considered it an unfair target because if the person didn't have the money to repay "you couldn't get blood out of a stone".

Daily has denied that he worked to secure prosecution decisions from Scotland's COPFS.

"You can't persuade [Scotland's public prosecution service] to prosecute," he says. "They make that decision independently."

Daily is asked if, as an investigator, he was set a target for the recovery of money from those who were being accused. He says yes.

Daily is then asked if his performance was measured, in part, against his target, to which he responds: "Not as a whole".

He's then asked that if he had not met his target for recovery of 40% of monies, would he have been marked down. He says not necessarily.

A document on screen shows Daily exceeded his target, but he says he wasn't rewarded by the Post Office for this.

Daily is asked about his relationship with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) in Scotland.

He says that he was asked by them about the specific dates when money had been allegedly stolen or gone missing, but adds that he cannot recall any other inquires they may have asked him to conduct.

Similarly, Daily says he cannot recall if they asked him to get audit data from Fujitsu - the company that created the Horizon software.

"Were you ever asked about the reliability of data from Horizon in any cases submitted to the COPFS?", asks the inquiry counsel. "I can't recall," Daily replies.

While we continue to listen to the inquiry, we can bring you another update on this Post Office scandal that has just come through.

A former head of Fujitsu UK, Duncan Tait, has admitted that he told former Post Office boss, Paula Vennells, that its Horizon IT system was like "Fort Knox".

Vennells informed MPs in 2020 that she was told branch accounts could only be changed by sub-postmasters. However, it has since emerged the accounts could be accessed remotely.

Tait has now admitted to the BBC he did tell Vennells that Horizon was like “Fort Knox” – meaning it was impossible for anything to get in our out - but says he was referring to "the cyber and physical security of Horizon and was unrelated to the remote access issue".

• Read more here

Image source, Shutterstock

The inquiry is looking at Daily's written statement again, where he says it was recognised by the Post Office legal service that they were not knowledgeable about Scots Law.

He's asked if this means that there were no Scottish-qualified lawyers within the criminal law team.

"Correct," he answers.

He's asked if it's right that, prior to solicitors coming on board to advise on Scottish cases in 2013, the criminal law team was providing a decision about whether a case should be passed to the COPFS, without being qualified in Scottish law.

"I believe so, yes," Daily says.

Inquiry counsel Emma Price is still asking Daily about procedural differences between England, Wales and Scotland. In a witness statement, he says his role involved disclosing information to solicitors representing the suspects. It adds that he was required to submit disclosure forms in England, but not in Scotland.

"What was required in Scotland if those schedules of disclosure were not?", asks Price.

"I can't recall," replies Daily.

His goes on to say that corroboration of evidence is required in Scotland - which means that two separate sources of evidence were needed.

Therefore, in Scotland, Horizon data alone would not be enough to proceed with a case, Daily explains. In England and Wales, on the other hand, he says it would.

Emily Atkinson
Live reporter, at the inquiry

A little earlier, we saw part of Daily's witness statement about the different instructions he received when dealing with investigations in Scotland and England.

In the statement, Daily says "the main difference at the time" in Scotland was that "a suspect was not offered a solicitor to be present at an interview".

Several people shake their heads in the public rows in front of me.

Daily has just been asked about his training in Scotland, where he joined the investigations team in 2005.

Earlier he told the inquiry his previously training had focused on the law in England and Wales. But he says that a few months after starting his new role in Scotland, he received some training on Scots law, which included attenting investigations as a second officer.

"Was this, in essence, on-the-job training?," asks inquiry counsel Price.

"Yes," replies Daily.

After a long pause, he admits he "honestly can't recall" how long the training lasted. He adds that he did a few interviews as a second officer, before he was "thrown in the deep end" as first officer.

Daily is asked if he was given training on the Horizon IT system while working as a permanent investigator in 2005.

He says he can't recall any. However, he says that when he was in a temporary role in 2000, he went to a hotel in Glasgow for a day to look at a system, but he can't remember what it was called.

He's asked if he ever received any training on the analysis of the data from the Horizon system.

"No," Daily responds.

Emily Atkinson
Live reporter, at the inquiry

I'm sitting on the media desks towards the back of the inquiry room, directly in line with Daily's chair. His voice wobbles as he responds to questions.

In front of him are neat rows of lawyers representing the participants. They take notes near constantly of the back and forth.

Behind them is a seating area reserved for members of the public, including some sub-postmasters. It's only about a quarter of the way full this morning. All are listening intently to Daily.

There's been little reaction so far from those watching.

But we're yet to get down to the key part of today's proceedings - the criminal investigations of sub-postmasters William Quarm and Peter Holmes. Both died before their names were cleared.

Out of sight, Marion Holmes - Peter's widow - watches on.

Investigations into both men began in 2008, when Daily was working as part of the Post Office's investigations North Team. So, plenty to come.

Daily is now being asked about the training he has received.

He admits that he did not have any experience in criminal investigations in England, Wales or Scotland before he took up a role as a temporary investigator in 2000.

Daily's witness statement shows that he received four to five weeks of training in 2005 by Royal Mail-accredited trainers, which covered the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Theft Act, and others. He says that this training focused on investigations in England and Wales.

"Were you aware from your initial investigator training that there was an obligation on a criminal investigator to pursue lines of inquiry which pointed away from the guilt of the suspect?"

"Yes," replies Daily.

He later agrees with Price that he was aware this duty to pursue a evidence that pointed away from a suspect also extended to material that was in the hands of a third party, such as Fujitsu - the company that created the Horizon software.

We've been seeing Daily's written statement from November on screen, in which he says the conduct of investigations in Scotland was similar to England and Wales, but that the key difference was in the prosecution of cases.

The prosecution authority in Scotland is the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS). The statement says all cases, including non-police cases, have to be submitted to the COPFS, which then decides whether to prosecute cases or not.

In 2006, it became a requirement that non-police authorities report cases through the COPFS website, it adds.

Inquiry counsel Emma Price asks how cases were submitted to the COPFS before then. Daily says a manual report - similar to a defender report - was delivered by post or hand.

During the discussion of his past employment history, Robert Daily admits that he erroneously included his wife's educational achievements intead of his own on his CV when applying for a position in 2008.

"Did you realise this and correct this at the time?" asks inquiry counsel Emma Price.

"No," replies Daily.

"So it's something that's only come to light during [this investigation]?," asks Price.

"Yes," replies Daily.

After a slight delay, the inquiry has begun with Robert Daily, former Post Office investigator, explaining his career history.

Daily confirms for the inquiry that he has been employed by the Post Office since 1979, starting as a counter clerk. He held various roles, including positions in the remittance unit, cash management and distribution, up until 1997.

Daily then joined the security team in the Post Office. He went on to hold temporary roles as investigation manager until this position was made permanent in 2005. In 2011, his role changed to security investigation manager, and his current role is that of security manager.

Image source, Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry